train accident near åsta 4 january 2000

To be sent with attachments to Hedmark and Oppland Public Prosecutor’s Office.

The Director General of Public Prosecutions has made the decision whether to prosecute in accordance with Section 22-3, second paragraph of the Prosecution Instructions, because the case is of “especially great general interest”. This prosecutorial appraisal covers only whether criminal charges should be brought against anyone. Other aspects of the case, for example, whether there are any circumstances warranting criticism, yet not criminal, regarding institutions or individuals, do not come under prosecutorial authority. Reference is made here to the Report of the Åsta Commission (NOU 2000:30).

To supplement the investigation documents, the Director General of Public Prosecutions has obtained information from the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the Norwegian Railway Inspectorate and the Norwegian National Railway Administration. The Director General of Public Prosecutions has also obtained the minutes of the hearings the Åsta Commission held. The technical report of the Police from these hearings is available upon request to parties involved in their continued work to improve railway safety.

The specific circumstances surrounding the accident and the manner in which the Røros Line was operated were thoroughly explained by the Commission and the police. There is no need for further discussion of the facts forming the basis of the decision whether to prosecute. It must be said that the public’s need for information was well served by the Commission’s open hearings and publication of its report.

As the police and public prosecutor recommend, the Director General of Public Prosecutions has concluded that criminal sanctions should be brought against the Norwegian National Railway Administration as an enterprise because the Norwegian National Railway Administration’s operation of the Røros Line as a whole was not proper from a safety standpoint during the time leading up to the accident and on the day of the accident. Regardless of whether any individual defect in the safety system would be sufficient for determining that the operation was improper, it is the view of the Director General of Public Prosecutions in any case that the operating conditions of the line overall must be characterised as improper. Among the conclusions of the Åsta Commission is the following (NOU 2000:30, page 176):

“Regardless of the direct cause leading the northbound train 2369 incorrectly to pass the departure signal at Rudstad station on 4 January 2000, the review of the causes allowing such a passing to take place at all and preventing the situation from being discovered earlier and stopped has shown a basic lack of a systematic approach in matters of safety.

          ….

It is the view of the Commission that the Åsta accident happened because at the Norwegian National Railway Administration there are basic deficiencies in safety consciousness and safety control that meant that the deficient level of safety along this stretch was in part not discovered and not followed up regardless. This basic deficiencies in safety control cover all parts of the Norwegian National Railway Administration’s operations that the Commission has examined, and should therefore be considered a serious fault of the system.”

 

The Commission has further concluded (page 173): “From the time the emergency arose until the collision occurred, more than four and a half minutes passed. During this time the train manager, assuming that he could contact the trains, would have been able to prevent the accident” (if he had been notified of the situation).

The police investigation supports these conclusions.

As the basis for criminal sanctions the Director General of Public Prosecutions has attached particular importance to the overall effect of the following circumstances, in light of the fact that compensatory measures were not taken to improve safety:

·        The Norwegian National Railway Administration introduced centralised traffic control (CTC) was without simultaneously introducing automatic train control (ATC).

·        There was not an effective system to intercept, and warn the train manager’s central office of, trains going in opposite directions on the same stretch.

·        There was no sure way for the train manager to be able to warn or stop trains in time in situations critical to safety.

·        A new departure procedure was introduced and used without the approval of the Norwegian National Railway Administration.

In the opinion of the Director General of Public Prosecutions, as the police and public prosecutor have concluded, there is no basis for criminal sanctions against other institutions or against individual persons. From the standpoint of criminal law it is the Norwegian National Railway Administration that must bear the responsibility for the offence that forms the basis of any criminal liability. Even if others knew of them, it was the job of the Norwegian National Railway Administration to analyse all circumstances crucial for safe train transport and to see to improving safety. It is here the failure lay, for which the Norwegian National Railway Administration is responsible.

According to Sections 2-5 and 1-4 of the Regulations of 10 July 1997 No. 781 Relating to Permission to Operate a Railway laid down pursuant to the Railways Act, the Norwegian National Railway Administration is responsible for “operations being conducted in a proper manner regarding safety”. In the view of the Director General of Public Prosecutions the Norwegian National Railway Administration did not fulfil this requirement on the day of the accident or during period leading up to the accident insofar as train transport on the Røros Line was concerned.

A corporate penalty is optional; whether or not to seek criminal sanctions if the circumstances warrant is a matter of discretion. In the view of the Director General of Public Prosecutions the offence of the Norwegian National Railway Administration is overall such that there are grounds to impose criminal sanctions. This office attaches particular weight to the fact that the accident could have been averted and that criminal sanctions may, it is hoped, help to avoid similar accidents in the future, cf. Section 48b of the Penal Code.

The Director General of Public Prosecutions requests that a corporate fine, cf. Chapter 3a of the Penal Code, be imposed against

for violation of

Section 14, cf. Section 6 of the Railways Act, cf. Sections 2-5 and 1-4 of Regulation No. 781 of 10 July 1997 Relating the Permission to Operate a Railway etc, cf. Section 48a of the Penal Code

as agency responsible for railroad operations, for negligently not having run in its operations in a proper manner with regard to safety.

Basis:

On 4 January 2000, and for a period before this, the Norwegian National Railway Administration’s operation of trains on the Røros Line was not sufficiently safe, especially because of the aggregate effect of the following circumstances:

·        the National Railway Administration introduced centralised traffic control (CTC) without simultaneously introducing automatic train control (ATC), and

·        there was no effective system to intercept, and warn the train manager’s central office of, trains going in opposite directions on same stretch of track, and

·        there was no sure way for the train manager to warn or stop trains in situations critical to safety, and

·        a new departure procedure was introduced and used without the approval of the Norwegian National Railway Administration

and without compensatory safety measures put in place.

The fine is set at NOK 10,000,000 – ten million kroner.

If this fine is not accepted, the Director General of Public Prosecutions requests that this case be brought to court, cf. Section 268 of the Criminal Procedure Act. In this case, the Director General wishes to be conferred with on the matter of who is to appear for the prosecution.

The Director General of Public Prosecutions has concluded that the offence of the Norwegian National Railway Administration does not fall under Section 151 of the Penal Code, which applies to anyone who negligently has “caused … a railway accident”. Neither the Commission nor the police have been able to determine with certainty the direct cause of the accident. Had the Norwegian National Railway Administration ensured satisfactory safety, the accident could have been averted, cf. inter alia pp. 173, 176 and 194 ff. of the Commission’s report. Nevertheless, in criminal law the Norwegian National Railway Administration cannot be said to have caused the accident. The provisions of Section 151 of the Penal Code therefore are not applied. The basis for criminal liability is not that the Norwegian National Railway Administration directly caused the accident, but the improper operating situation of the Røros Line as it is described in this document.